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While governments often wish to restrict certain goods from crossing borders, their means and will are often insufficient to discourage business minded traders. Smuggling is thus prevalent and can result in violence, corruption, distorted competition and loss of tariff revenue (see Naim 2005 and
Fisman and Wei 2004).
In China smuggling is a severe problem authorities have been trying to tackle for many years.
According to the General Administration of Customs, customs and police departments have prosecuted more than 90,000 smuggling cases involving goods worth $24. Recent research (Fisman and Wei 2004, 2009 ) used discrepancies in official trade statistics to detect smuggling, asserting that imports or exports missing from one country's reports may have been smuggled, misreported or underinvoiced, as noted by Bhagwati (1964) . They found that high tariffs and corrupt environments make smuggling more likely. In this paper we argue that another crucial ingredient for smuggling to occur is international networks. Rauch and Trindade (2002) showed that ethnic Chinese networks, notably through interpersonal relationships known as guanxi, could act as trade catalysts by enforcing contracts and providing market information. As smuggling occurs outside the law, market information is hard to find and trust is all the more important to overcome hold-up problems (see Marcouiller 2000) . Overseas Chinese networks should hence increase tariff evasion in Chinese trade.
We test this prediction by combining the analysis of Fisman and Wei (2004) with that of Rauch and Trindade (2002) . More precisely, we show that the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports, i.e. the log difference of exports reported by exporting countries and imports reported by China, increases significantly in the number of overseas Chinese in the exporting country. This result holds under various specifications, different periods and various indicators of Chinese networks. We also find that Chinese networks help tariff evasion in their host countries, and that this effect is highest in corrupt countries.
As some may argue that the gap in trade values is too noisy of a measure to capture smuggling, we show that the results also hold when missing imports are measured in quantities. Moreover, we find that, while tariff evasion is more pronounced in differentiated products (as classified by Rauch 1999), Chinese networks appear more useful in evading tariffs when it is hardest, i.e. for nondifferentiated goods.
To show that our results are not due to luck or an omitted variable bias, we run placebo tests interacting tariff with country characteristics that may be correlated with Chinese immigration, such as GDP, distance to China, and trade with China. We find that contiguity and corruption do increase tariff evasion but that the interaction with Chinese networks is robust, losing significance in only one case out of twelve, probably due to collinearity.
We also estimate our model for four Southeast Asian countries and find some evidence, though less robust, of an Indonesian and a Philippine network, suggesting the results may not be specific to overseas Chinese.
To check whether tariff evasion occurs through misreporting, i.e. the declaration of imports as similar goods with lower tariffs, we follow Fisman and Wei (2004) and include the average tariff on similar goods in our model and also add its interaction with the tariff spread within similar product categories. In partner countries, we find evidence of Chinese networks and corruption increasing misreporting, but only when the tariff spread is of at least 10 percentage points.
In the next section we review the literature. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the results and the last concludes.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
The idea that discrepancy in trade statistics could be attributed to smuggling dates back to Bhagwati (1964) . In theory, what one country reports as imports should be equal to what its partner reports as exports, (or plus cost of freight and insurance (cif) if values are reported, rather than quantities). In practice, this is rarely the case. Smuggling may be one of the reasons. Goods may be undervalued or misreported, often with the complicity of customs officials who may take a bribe rather than impose a barrier, or, they can enter or leave a country circumventing customs altogether, hence appearing only on one side. Fisman and Wei (2004) looked at the missing trade between Hong Kong and China. They found that an increase in tariff (plus VAT) of one percentage point resulted in a 3% increase in evasion 2 .
They also argued that tariff evasion happened through misreporting in similar categories. Yet very little research has gone further to identify the determinants of tariff evasion beyond high tariffs and corruption. Two notable exceptions are Yang (2008) , who studied the effect of customs reforms on tariff evasion in the Philippines, and Anson et al. (2006) , who examined whether preshipment inspection in Indonesia, the Philippines and Argentina were effective in decreasing tariff evasion. Both pre-shipment inspection schemes and customs reforms had mixed results. Fisman, Moustatersky and Wei (2008) is the only paper that underlined the role of experts' knowledge in facilitating smuggling. They provided evidence that indirect trade through Hong Kong's warehouses, which involves agents specialized in processing and distribution, is also a tariff evasion process.
Another branch of international trade focuses on the role of migrant networks in facilitating trade.
Greif (1993) pioneered this field studying how Maghribi trading networks of the 11 th century could promote trade by providing community enforcement of sanctions that deter violations of contracts.
Similarly, Rauch and Trindade (2002) showed that ethnic Chinese trade networks help to match buyers and sellers in the international marketplace by providing market information and enforcing contracts. Moreover, Dunlevy (2006) found that migrant networks were most important for trade in corrupt environments, where trust is most necessary. These mechanisms should hence also be at work for tariff evasion and might have even stronger impacts.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are at least two reasons why migrant networks should also be at work for illicit trade and might have even stronger impacts than on legal trade. The first is that trade matching in an underground activity is even more complicated. Market information does not flow freely and this makes it difficult to learn about illegal and highly profitable opportunities. Overseas Chinese may know exactly which businessmen are ready to engage in tariff evasion transactions and which varieties are in supply and demand in both China and their host countries. As Kotkin (1992) states, "Chinese entrepreneurs remain, in essence, arbitrageurs, their widespread dispersion a critical means of identifying prime business opportunities" (cited in Rauch and Trindade 2002) . Besides information about the structure of the market, they may know which customs agents are corrupt, both in China and in their host country, and thus smooth the process of bribery.
Second, the total absence of a legal contract enforcement mechanism makes trust enhancement crucial for traders wishing to evade tariffs. For instance, when tariff evasion takes place through double invoicing, exporters send an "informal" invoice directly to the importers indicating the true value of the shipment, while another "official" invoice that undervalues the goods and accompanies these through customs. Enforcing payment of the "informal" invoice can only be done outside the law, rendering trust the most important. Trust was found to be most important for trade when formal institutions are absent and in corrupt environments (Dunlevy 2006) . Chinese networks provide this trust notably through interpersonal relationships known as guanxi formed by members with a common background. Lee (2010) states that, in China, a guanxi based on loyalty "may be crucial in determining business successes or at least in pursuing business opportunities since the rules of law have long been absent for the protection of private property rights and economic increase in tariff has a lower impact on evasion the better the quality of custom enforcement. We can extend their logic by adding in the cost of evasion a probability of getting caught that diminishes with Chinese networks. The idea is that it is less risky to do business with overseas
Chinese who are more trustworthy, know which customs agents are corrupt, know how to package the goods to disguise them and how to fill export declarations appropriately, and are hence less likely to "mess up" the trade. Indeed, an OECD report (2009) on modus operandi of foreign bribery through intermediaries explains how, when family, friends and other third persons act as intermediaries, "the principal company knows the identity of the foreign public official who receives the bribe". It can then be shown that a decrease in the probability of getting caught increases the tariff elasticity of evasion.
Another way to look at this is to think of illicit trade as a matching process à la Rauch and Casella (2002) . In their model, a successful match is seen as a joint venture between partners in both countries who share profits equally. But some matches are unsuccessful as ex ante information is insufficient for all matches to be profitable. A subset of individuals, i.e. the migrants network, has more information about opportunities abroad and hence benefits from these ties to achieve a higher level of profitability in international trade. We can think of tariff evasion as a process only members of the migrant network know ex ante and which makes trade more profitable. Hence tariff evasion should increase with group ties.
In summary, these theoretical explanations imply Chinese networks play a facilitating role in tariff evasion in trade with China. This occurs through the provision of market information, informal contract enforcement and the smoothing of bribery at borders. The empirical analysis aims at testing this prediction.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We use 2005 trade data from Comtrade to compute, for each HS6 product (about 5000 products) and around 160 trade partners, missing imports as log (1+exports to China declared by exporting countries) -log (1+imports declared by China). We use both values and quantity data 3 . We dropped from our dataset all countries that did not report any exports (and any imports when testing the prediction on the partners' side). A list of remaining countries is in the appendix.
We use applied tariff data from TRAINS (simple averages) 4 , corruption data from the Worldwide 5 . Summary statistics are in Table 1 . Table 1 We use 2005 tariff and trade data for two main reasons. The first is that it maximises data availability. The second is that, as explained by Ahn et al. Where foreign-born data are not available the database uses the foreign nationality criterion.
Before testing our main prediction, we estimate the effect of tariffs on Chinese, as well as four southeast Asian, missing imports, i.e., using the following model 6 :
(1) missing imports ik = α i + β tariff ik +ε ik where α i is a partner fixed effect and k is a product (HS6-digit tariff line) indicator. Table 2 summarizes the results. We find that a 10 percentage point increase in tariff increases missing imports by about 32%, which is very close to the 30% estimated by Fisman and Wei (2004) for trade with Hong Kong. This effect is more than twice as high as in Southeast Asia, where it lies around 13%. Table 2 We then estimate the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports per partner country, dropping countries with too few observations (less than 70), and plot it against the size of the overseas Chinese community (Figure 2 ). We find a positive relationship suggesting migrant networks may increase tariff evasion 7 . We investigate this further in the next section. 
IV. CHINESE NETWORKS AND ILLICIT TRADE
To examine the role of migrant networks more carefully we interact the migrant network variable with tariffs and estimate:
(2) missing imports ik = α i + β 1 tariff ik + β 2 (tariff ik * log (1 + Chinese i )) +ε ik
We also estimate the model using Chinese migrants' share of population instead of the size of the Chinese community. As suggested by Rauch and Trindade (2002) , the number of Chinese migrants may indicate the number of potential Chinese connections with the partner country, while the share of the country's population may proxy the probability of picking a Chinese business partner in the foreign country. Results are in Table 3 . For both values and quantities we find evidence of a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of Chinese networks and tariffs, which also holds when including partner-industry (HS4) fixed effects (not shown). This confirms our prediction that Chinese networks increase tariff evasion. We also adopted a specification with product and partner fixed effects, controlling for all product and partner level characteristics. The coefficient on the interaction term remains positive and significant, though at the 11% level for values. Table 3 Figure 3 summarizes the results of column (1) in Table 3 , showing how the effect of tariff on missing imports increases as the ethnic Chinese overseas population increases. In trade with the US,
where there is more than 1.5 million Chinese-born, an increase in tariff from 10% to 20% would increase the value of missing imports by almost 40%. However, in trade with France, where only about 40,000 Chinese migrants live, the same tariff change would increase evasion by less than 25%.
Figure 3
We also estimate the same regression for four Southeast Asian countries. We find a positive and significant effect of migrant networks on tariff evasion for Indonesia and the Philippines, suggesting the results may not be specific to overseas Chinese ( countries could be used in the estimation) 9 . Table 6 As overseas Chinese could be capturing other country characteristics or bilateral affinity that could at missing quantities, the coefficient on the interaction of tariff and Chinese networks remains significant. Overall, these tests suggest that the effect of Chinese networks on tariff evasion is not channelled through other partner country characteristics related to trade or development. to "negotiate" duties." Tariff dodgers could be declaring imports under a "wrong" product category with a lower tariff, and this with the consent of corrupt customs officials. As outlined above,
Chinese migrants might know how to package the goods to disguise them and how to fill export declarations appropriately to smooth the misreporting process.
We explore this possibility by firstly replicating the tests of Fisman and Wei (2004) who include the average tariff on similar goods (within the same HS4 category) on the right hand side of our benchmark regression model (equation (1)) to capture incentives to misclassify imports 10 . The idea is that the lower the average tariff on similar products; the higher will be the amount of misreported imports, and hence the higher the missing imports. A negative and significant coefficient on the average tariff on similar products would thus provide evidence of tariff evasion through misreporting. As seen in columns (1) and (4) The lower is the tariff on similar goods and the higher is the tariff dispersion, the higher the 10 In their paper, Fisman and Wei (2004) use a weighted average tariff on similar products, with the export values as weights. Their (implicit) assumption is that exports are reported truthfully. This assumption becomes more problematic in our setting with a cross-section of exporters. We nevertheless ran the misreporting tests also with the weighted average in both values and quantities (results not reported) and find similar results.
incentives for misreporting. To test for this, we interact tariff on similar goods with the spread of tariffs within HS4 categories. For quantities, we find a negative and significant coefficient on this interaction suggesting misreporting may occur but only when the tariff spread is of at least 15 percentage points, which represent few cases 11 . We then investigate whether Chinese networks increase the misreporting results but do not find any such evidence (results not reported). Table 8 This test cannot however capture all types of misreporting. Misreporting may occur in similar goods at the 6 digit level, or in any type of service. For example, a portion of the true value of chicken imports might be declared as marketing services. We leave these questions to further research as our data does not allow computing average tariffs of similar products within 6-digit categories and does not cover trade in services.
Finally, as both Javorcik and Narciso (2008) and Mishra et al. (2008) argue that a higher level of product differentiation increases tariff evasion due to a greater difficulty in ascertaining product price and hence in detecting false reports, we check if this is also the case for Chinese tariff evasion.
We use the Rauch (1999) classification and identify products as non-differentiated when both the liberal and conservative classifications indicate that the product is either traded on organized markets or listed in trade publications. Results in table 9 indicate that, as found by previous research, for both values and quantities, a higher degree of product differentiation increases the tariff semi-elasticity of missing imports, hence tariff evasion. However, product differentiation decreases the role of Chinese networks as the coefficient on the interaction of Chinese networks, tariff and the non-differentiated dummy is positive and significant. This result is robust to the inclusion of product and partner fixed effects. This suggests Chinese networks are all the more necessary when evasion is hardest, i.e. for homogenous commodities.
11 Less than 3% of the "partner country-HS4" observations have a tariff spread larger than 15%. Following the same logic, we use the tariff deviation from the average tariff on similar products (within the same HS4 category) as a measure of misreporting incentives. In presence of misclassification, high deviation should lead to high missing imports. However, we fail to find any evidence in that direction (the coefficient turns out to be negative and significant or insignificant). Here, the missing import variable is the log difference between exports reported by China and imports reported by partner countries. The tariffs are those imposed on Chinese imports in partner countries. We also add corruption to the specification, as it varies across countries and should affect the tariff elasticity of missing imports as it might create a more "smuggling-friendly" environment.
Tariff dodgers are more likely to escape legal penalties in corrupt countries where customs officials are more inclined to take the bribe than to enforce the law. Results are in table 10. Table 10 Again we find evidence, for both values and quantities, that Chinese communities increase tariff evasion on goods that come from China. While their expertise is found to be most useful in the most corrupt countries, it remains so in countries with moderate levels of corruption. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which shows how the effect of tariff on missing imports is highest when corruption is high and when Chinese communities are biggest. The statistical significance of the coefficients can be verified in the lower panel. This result confirms the theoretical prediction on the role of the interaction between network communities and high corruption in lowering the probability of being caught.
Figure 4
We also carry out misreporting tests and get similar results as the interaction of average tariff on similar goods with the tariff spread is again negative and significant (columns 2 and 5 of table 11).
Strong evidence of misreporting emerges for tariff evasion in quantities, as the marginal effect of the average tariff on similar goods is negative for all tariff spreads. What's more, we here find that misreporting might be at its highest not only when the tariff spread is high but also when corruption and Chinese networks are big (last row of table 11), suggesting the latter play a role in tariff evasion through misreporting. This fits well with anecdotal evidence from the Philippines where imports of white rice, which normally require an import license and are subject to a 50% duty and 12% VAT, 
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper argues that a crucial ingredient for smuggling to occur is the presence of international While this paper provides evidence of widespread tariff evasion through underinvoicing and sometimes, misreporting in similar goods, tariff evasion can take many other forms, such as transhipment via third countries and misreporting of goods as services, where networks might play even stronger roles. Identifying these practices, as well as disentangling the information and trust channels, makes for promising future research. Summary statistics are computed on the datasets that are used for the main estimations. Statistics for Chinese, Chinese share and corruption are calculated using the dataset with variables for tariff evasion in China. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. † indicates a p-value of 0.106.
All partner FE regressions are estimated through least square dummy variable (LSDV). Regressions with partner and product fixed-effects are estimated taking "within" product deviations and adding partner dummies. Partner and product Partner Partner Partner FE regressions are estimated through least square dummy variable (LSDV). Regressions with partner and product fixed-effects are estimated taking "within" product deviations and adding partner dummies. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. "Non-differentiated" equals 1 if both the liberal and conservative classifications of Rauch (1999) indicate that the product is either traded on organized markets or listed in trade publications and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All partner FE regressions are estimated through LSDV. Regressions with partner and product fixed-effects are estimated taking "within" product deviations and adding partner dummies. .03
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